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1 Introduction
Consider a two-period single-good economy with incomplete asset markets. It
is well-understood that competitive equilibria in this setting are constrained
efficient in the sense that a Pareto improvement cannot be achieved by re-
allocating the existing assets ([3]), while being generically Pareto inefficient
(see, for example, [6]). In other words, at a competitive equilibrium, agents’
marginal valuations for the tradable assets are equal when evaluated ex-ante,
but are typically not equal conditional on the true state of the world, for every
realization of the uncertainty.
This suggests that information that partially resolves the uncertainty will
typically induce agents to rebalance their portfolios, if such information were
to become publicly available after the initial round of trade. We show that
this is indeed the case, and explicitly characterize the set of public signals
that lead to retrade. Since retrading occurs after the arrival of information
if and only if it generates disagreement among agents regarding the marginal
value of assets, this characterization is closely tied to the events conditional
on which asset valuations are equalized in equilibrium.
We define an equal-valuation event to be a subset of states Sˆ with the
property that, at a competitive equilibrium, agents’ marginal valuations for
assets are equal conditional on Sˆ for any economy, but generically not equal
conditional on a strict subset of Sˆ. Thus the set of equal-valuation events is the
finest partition of the state space conditional on which agents’ asset valuations
are equal in equilibrium for a generic economy. We show that information that
affects only the relative probabilities of equal-valuation events does not lead
to retrade while, for a generic subset of endowments, retrade does occur if the
information alters the relative probabilities of states within an equal-valuation
event. For a generic subset of endowments, therefore, the latter condition is
both necessary and sufficient for the information to lead to retrade. If markets
are incomplete, the subset of public signals that satisfy this condition is itself
generic in the set of all public signals.
While there is a substantial literature on trading in financial markets in
response to news, little has been said on the characteristics of news that induces
agents to retrade. A class of no-trade results can be traced back to [7] who
show that the arrival of information does not lead to retrade if the initial
allocation is Pareto efficient. This leaves open the question of retrading in
a competitive economy with incomplete markets. In this setting, [1] provide
sufficient conditions on a public signal such that retrade occurs for a generic
economy. We generalize their result (in Theorem 4.3) by providing a weaker
sufficient condition, for a broader class of public signals (including signals that
induce a partition of the state space), and for an arbitrary asset structure.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the economy in the next
section. In Section 3, we introduce the notion of an equal-valuation event and
analyze its properties. Then, in Section 4, we consider a public signal observed
by agents after the initial round of trade, and characterize the set of signals
that lead to retrade.
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2 The Economy
We consider an exchange economy under uncertainty with two periods, 0 and
1, and a single physical consumption good. Asset markets open at date 0. At
date 1 assets pay off. Our aim is to identify the types of unanticipated public
information that would lead to retrade, if such information were to arrive after
agents have traded at date 0 but before the realization of the uncertainty. In
this section we describe the basic environment, with no arrival of information.
The economy is populated by H ≥ 2 agents, with typical agent h ∈ H
(here, and elsewhere, we use the same symbol for a set and its cardinality).
Uncertainty is parametrized by S states of the world. The probability of state
s is pis (pis > 0 for all s, and
∑
s pis = 1). Agent h ∈ H has endowments ωh0 > 0
in period 0 and ωh ∈ RS++ in period 1, and time-separable expected utility
preferences with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions uh0 : R++ → R
for period 0 consumption and uh : R++ → R for period 1 consumption. We
assume that uh is twice continuously differentiable, uh
′
> 0, uh
′′
< 0, and
limc→0 uh
′
(c) =∞;1 the same assumptions apply to uh0 .
There are J ≥ 2 assets. Asset payoffs are given by the S × J matrix R,
whose (s, j)’th element is rjs, the payoff of asset j in state s. We denote the
j’th column of R by rj and the s’th row of R by r>s (by default all vectors are
column vectors, unless transposed). Thus rj is the vector of payoffs of asset
j, and rs is the vector of asset payoffs in state s. We assume, without loss of
generality, that R has full column rank J . Markets are complete if J = S, and
incomplete if J < S.
We parametrize economies by agents’ date 1 endowments ω := {ωh}h∈H ∈
Ω := RSH++. Let p ∈ RJ be the vector of asset prices (date 0 consumption serves
as the numeraire), and yh ∈ RJ the portfolio of agent h. The consumption of
agent h is then given by ωh0 − p · yh at date 0, and ωhs + rs · yh in state s at
date 1. Let y := {yh}h∈H . A competitive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 Given an economy ω ∈ Ω, a competitive equilibrium consists
of a portfolio allocation y, and prices p, satisfying the following two conditions:
(a) Agent optimization: ∀h ∈ H, yh solves
max
yh∈RJ
(
uh0
[
ωh0 − p · yh
]
+
∑
s∈S
pis u
h
[
ωhs + rs · yh
])
. (1)
(b) Market clearing: ∑
h∈H
yh = 0. (2)
Notation. In our analysis we use the following shorthand notation for matrices.
Given an index set N with typical element n, and a collection {zn}n∈N of
1 Here, and in what follows, we denote by uh
′
and uh
′′
the first and second derivative of
the utility function uh.
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vectors or matrices, we denote by diagn∈N [zn] the (block) diagonal matrix
with typical entry zn, where n varies across all elements of N . In similar
fashion, we write [. . . zn . . .n∈N ] to denote the row block with typical element
zn, and analogously for column blocks. We drop reference to the index set
if it is obvious from the context: for example diagh∈H is shortened to diagh,
and [. . . zs . . .s∈S ] to [. . . zs . . .s]. We use the same symbol 0 for the zero scalar
and the zero matrix; in the latter case we occasionally indicate the dimension
in order to clarify the argument. A “∗” stands for any term whose value is
immaterial to the analysis.
3 Equal-Valuation Events and Risk-Sharing
In our characterization of the set of public signals that lead to retrade, a key
role is played by the notion of an equal-valuation event, a minimal event condi-
tional on which agents’ asset valuations are equal in equilibrium. We formalize
this notion as follows. Consider a partition of S given by {S1, . . . , SK}. For
each k ∈ K := {1, . . . ,K}, let Lk be the subspace of RJ spanned by the vec-
tors {rs}s∈Sk . We say that the subspaces L1, . . . , LK are linearly independent
if
∑
k∈K `k = 0, `k ∈ Lk, implies `k = 0 for all k. Henceforth, we choose a
partition for which L1, . . . , LK are linearly independent, and K is maximal.
2
We denote this partition by S(R).3
Lemma 3.1 The partition S(R) is unique.
The proof is in the Appendix. We will show below (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2)
that an event Sk in S(R) is a subset of S satisfying the two properties stated
in the Introduction, namely that (a) conditional on this event, agents’ asset
valuations are equal in equilibrium, and (b) conditional on a strict subset
of this event, agents’ asset valuations are not equal at any equilibrium, for
a generic (i.e. open and dense)4 subset of endowments. Thus, for a generic
subset of endowments, S(R) is the finest partition of S conditional on which
asset valuations are equalized across agents in equilibrium. Accordingly, for a
given asset payoff matrix R, we refer to S(R) as the equal-valuation partition
and Sk ∈ S(R) as an equal-valuation event.
If there is a state s ∈ S in which the payoff of every asset is zero, i.e.
rs = 0, the singleton event {s} is clearly an equal-valuation event. It is useful
to separate such zero-payoff states and denote by S? the set of states s ∈ S for
which rs 6= 0. Without loss of generality we can order the partition S(R) so
that the first K? equal-valuation events {S1, . . . , SK?} are subsets of S?, while
2 The same partition is employed by [4] (Section III) in order to characterize the degree
of indeterminacy of equilibria with nominal assets.
3 The partition S(R) can be calculated by studying the equation system L(a) :=∑
s∈S asrs = 0, where a := {as} is a vector in RS . A subset Sˆ of S is a union of equal-
valuation events if and only
∑
s∈Sˆ asrs = 0, for every zero of L. By checking this condition
for every subset of S, we can determine the partition S(R).
4 More precisely, given a subset E of Euclidean space, endowed with the relative Euclidean
topology, we say that E′ ⊂ E is a generic subset of E if it is open and dense in E.
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the remaining equal-valuation events each consist of single zero-payoff state.
Moreover we can order the states in S so that the first S1 states correspond
to the event S1, the following S2 states correspond to the event S2, and so
on. Let R? be the submatrix of R consisting of the first S? rows (these are
the nonzero rows of R), and let the dimension of Lk be denoted by Jk. Then
we have
∑
k∈K? Jk = J (note that Jk = 0 for k /∈ K?). The following lemma
shows that the partition S(R) is invariant to changes in asset payoffs that
do not affect the column span of R. Moreover, R? is column-equivalent to a
block-diagonal matrix, with each block corresponding to an equal-valuation
event Sk, k ∈ K?:
Lemma 3.2 Suppose the asset payoff matrices R and R′ are column-equivalent.
Then S(R) = S(R′). Furthermore, R is column-equivalent to(
diagk∈K? [Rk]
———————
0(K−K?)×J
)
,
(3)
where Rk is an Sk × Jk matrix with rank(Rk) = Jk > 0.
The proof is in the Appendix. Lemma 3.2 implies that for each equal-valuation
event that is not a zero-payoff state a portfolio can be found that pays off only
in that event. We say that an equal-valuation event Sk is trivial if it is a
singleton, and nontrivial otherwise. A trivial equal-valuation event consists of
a single state that is either a zero-payoff state or an insurable state (i.e. for
which the corresponding Arrow security can be replicated with the available
assets), while a nontrivial equal-valuation event consists of two or more states,
none of which is a zero-payoff state or an insurable state.
In our retrading results, an important role is played by the complete-
ness or incompleteness of the asset structure, in particular relative to the
nonzero-payoff states S?. We say that asset markets are S?-complete if they
are complete relative to S? (i.e. if J = S?), and S?-incomplete otherwise (if
J < S?).5 A nontrivial equal-valuation event exists if and only if markets are
S?-incomplete. Moreover, an equal-valuation event Sk is nontrivial if and only
if Sk > Jk > 0.
6
Example 1. Suppose there are four states of the world: S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}.
Consider a nontraded cashflow that pays
d =

1
2
3
4

.
5 These definitions reduce to the usual notions of completeness and incompleteness if all
the rows of R are nonzero.
6 If Sk = Jk, the fact that rank(Rk) = Jk implies that Rk is column-equivalent to the
identity matrix, so that Sk is not an equal-valuation event unless it is trivial.
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There are two traded assets, a debt claim on d with face value 2, and a residual
equity claim. Thus the asset payoff matrix is
R =

1 0
2 0
2 1
2 2

.
It is easy to verify there is only one equal-valuation event, i.e. S(R) = {S}. ‖
Example 2. Consider the asset structure in Example 1. Suppose that, in ad-
dition to risky debt and levered equity, a riskfree asset is also available. Thus
the asset payoff matrix is
R =

1 0 1
2 0 1
2 1 1
2 2 1

,
which is column-equivalent to 
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 1 1
0 1 2

.
Therefore the equal-valuation partition S(R) is given by {S1, S2}, where S1 is
a trivial equal-valuation event consisting of the single insurable state s1, and
S2 = {s2, s3, s4} is a nontrivial equal-valuation event. ‖
An assumption commonly employed in the incomplete-markets literature
is that the asset payoff matrix R is in general position, meaning that every
J × J submatrix of R is nonsingular. If R is in general position, and markets
are incomplete, there is only one equal-valuation event.7 The argument is as
follows. Since, all the rows of R are nonzero (due to the general position of R),
and markets are incomplete, there exists a nontrivial equal-valuation event,
which we can take to be S1 without loss of generality. By the general position
property, any collection of J ′ rows of R, with J ′ ≤ J , is linearly independent,
so that we must have S1 > J . But this implies that dim(L1) = J . Hence there
is no equal-valuation event other than S1. The converse is not true, however:
the asset payoff matrix in Example 1 is not in general position; yet there is
only one equal-valuation event.
Henceforth, we will take R to be of the block-diagonal form (3). Due to
Lemma 3.2, this entails no loss of generality.
7 It is also worth noting that if R is in general position, so is any R′ that is column-
equivalent to R.
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We now characterize risk-sharing at a competitive equilibrium in term of
equal-valuation events. The first-order conditions for the utility-maximization
program (1),∑
s∈S
pis u
h′[ωhs + rs · yh] rs − uh0 ′[ωh0 − p · yh] p = 0, ∀h ∈ H, (4)
imply that∑
s∈S pis u
h′[ωhs + rs · yh] rs
uh0
′[
ωh0 − p · yh
] = ∑s∈S pis uhˆ′[ωhˆs + rs · yhˆ] rs
uhˆ0
′[
ωhˆ0 − p · yhˆ
] , ∀h, hˆ ∈ H.
(5)
Thus asset valuations (by which we mean the marginal rates of substitution
between assets and period 0 consumption) are equalized across agents when
evaluated ex-ante, i.e. at the time of trading. This is just the standard re-
sult that competitive equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient. In order to
economize on notation, we let
µhhˆ(y, p) :=
uh0
′[
ωh0 − p · yh
]
uhˆ0
′[
ωhˆ0 − p · yhˆ
] ,
and use the shorthand uhs
′
:= uh
′[
ωhs + rs · yh
]
and uhs
′′
:= uh
′′[
ωhs + rs · yh
]
.
Then (5) can be written as∑
s∈S
pis
(
uhs
′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′)
rs = 0, ∀h, hˆ ∈ H. (6)
Since the subspaces L1, . . . , LK are linearly independent, the following result
is immediate:
Theorem 3.1 At any equilibrium (y, p) of ω ∈ Ω,∑
s∈Sk
pis
(
uhs
′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′)
rs = 0, ∀h, hˆ ∈ H; Sk ∈ S(R).
In other words, at a competitive equilibrium, asset valuations are equalized
across agents not only unconditionally, but also conditional on any equal-
valuation event (or union of equal-valuation events). It follows that if, after
trading, agents were to receive a public signal that induces the equal-valuation
partition, they would not retrade since their asset valuations are already equal
conditional on this partition.
Specializing Theorem 3.1 to an insurable state, we have the standard result:
Corollary 3.1 If s is an insurable state, then at any equilibrium (y, p) of
ω ∈ Ω, uhs ′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′
= 0, for all h, hˆ ∈ H.
For a generic subset of endowments, the converse of Theorem 3.1 is true
as well, so that we can strengthen the result as follows:
8 Piero Gottardi, Rohit Rahi
Theorem 3.2 There is a generic subset Ωˆ of Ω, such that at any equilibrium
(y, p) of ω ∈ Ωˆ, ∑
s∈Sˆ
pis
(
uhs
′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′)
rs = 0, ∀h, hˆ ∈ H, (7)
if and only if Sˆ is a union of equal-valuation events.
Thus, for a generic subset of endowments, the equal-valuation partition S(R)
is the finest partition of S conditional on which agents’ asset valuations are
equal in equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 uses the transversality theorem. Since we also ex-
ploit transversality in the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 in the next section, it
is useful to summarize the argument here. Consider a function Ψ : Rn × E → Rm,
where E is an open subset of Euclidean space and m > n. For e ∈ E , let Ψe
be the function Ψ(·, e). The argument involves identifying such a function Ψ ,
such that the desired result can be formulated as Ψ−1e (0) = ∅, for every e in
a generic subset of E . We show that the Jacobian Dx,eΨ has full row rank at
all zeros (x, e) of Ψ , i.e. Ψ is transverse to zero. By the transversality theorem,
there is then a dense subset Eˆ of E such that, for each e ∈ Eˆ , Ψe : Rn → Rm is
transverse to zero. It follows that Ψ−1e (0) = ∅. In other words, the equation
system Ψe(x) = 0 has no solution since the number of (locally) independent
equations m exceeds the number of unknowns n. A standard argument (see,
for example, [2]) establishes that the set Eˆ is open, and hence a generic subset
of E .
Proof of Theorem 3.2:
We begin by characterizing a competitive equilibrium as a solution to a system
of (locally) independent equations. Let g(y) = 0 and f(y, p, ω) = 0 denote the
equation systems (2) and (4) respectively. The tuple (y, p) is a competitive
equilibrium for economy ω if and only if it satisfies
F (y, p, ω) :=
(
f(y, p, ω)
g(y)
)
= 0, (8)
which consists of JH + J equations, equal to the number of unknowns (y, p).
The Jacobian of F can be written as follows:
Dy,p,ωF =
(
Dy,pf Dωf
Dy,pg 0
)
,
with
Dωf = diagh
[
. . . pis u
h
s
′′
rs . . .s
]
and
Dy,pg = (. . . IJ . . .h 0),
where IJ is the J ×J identity matrix. The matrix Dωf has full row rank since
R has full column rank. Clearly, Dy,pg has full row rank as well.
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We now proceed with the proof of the theorem. If Sˆ is a union of equal-
valuation events, equation (7) holds due to Theorem 3.1. To prove the converse,
suppose Sˆ is not a union of equal-valuation events. Then there is a nontrivial
equal-valuation event, which we can take to be S1 without loss of generality,
such that Sˆ contains some but not all elements of S1. Hence we can write S1
as the union of two nonempty and disjoint sets, Sˆ1 := S1∩ Sˆ and Sˇ1 := S1\Sˆ1.
We reorder the set S1 so that the states in Sˆ1 appear before the states in Sˇ1.
Recall that R1 is the first diagonal block of R
? corresponding to the equal-
valuation event S1. R1 can be partitioned as follows:(
Rˆ1
——
Rˇ1
)
,
where Rˆ1 consists of the rows of R1 corresponding to the states in Sˆ1, while
Rˇ1 consists of the remaining rows of R1, i.e. those corresponding to the states
in Sˇ1. Consider the S1 × 2J1 matrix
Qˆ1 :=
(
Rˆ1
∣∣ Rˆ1
————
0
∣∣ Rˇ1
)
.
This matrix is column equivalent to a block-diagonal matrix whose diagonal
blocks are Rˆ1 and Rˇ1. It follows that rank(Qˆ1) = rank(Rˆ1) + rank(Rˇ1). Since
S1 is an equal-valuation event, the row spaces of Rˆ1 and Rˇ1 have a nontrivial
intersection, implying that rank(Rˆ1) + rank(Rˇ1) > rank(R1) = J1. It follows
that rank(Qˆ1) > J1.
Let rˆj := [. . . rjs . . .s∈Sˆ1 01×Sˇ1 ]
>, a vector in RS1 . Since rank(Qˆ1) > J1,
we can pick j ∈ J1 such that rˆj lies outside the column span of R1 (in other
words, we can choose one of the first J1 columns of Qˆ1 such that it is outside
the span of the last J1 columns of Qˆ1). We fix such a value of j for the
remainder of the proof. Due to the block structure of R given by (3), the vector
[rˆj 01×(S−S1)]
> = [. . . rjs . . .s∈Sˆ1 01×(S−Sˆ1)]
> lies outside the column span
of R. In other words, the matrix
A :=
(
. . . rjs . . .s∈Sˆ1 01×(S−Sˆ1)
————————————–
. . . rs . . .s∈S
)
(9)
has full row rank J + 1. We will use this fact below.
It suffices to establish the theorem for the first two agents, h1 and h2.
We will show that, for ω in a generic subset of Ω, there is no solution to the
equation system
Ψ1(y, p, ω) :=
(
F (y, p, ω)∑
s∈Sˆ pis
(
uh1s
′ − µh1h2 uh2s ′
)
rjs
)
= 0.
Since j ∈ J1, rjs = 0 for all s /∈ S1, so that the sum over Sˆ in this equation
system can be restricted to Sˆ1. Hence, the Jacobian Dy,p,ωΨ1, evaluated at a
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zero (y, p, ω) of Ψ1, is
∗ ∣∣ diagh[. . . pis uhs ′′rs . . .s]
—————————————————————
Dy,pg
∣∣ 0
—————————————————————
∗ ∣∣ [. . . pis uh1s ′′rjs . . .s∈Sˆ1 01×(S−Sˆ1)] ∗

.
The Jacobian is row-equivalent to
∗ ∣∣ . . . pis uh1s ′′rjs . . .s∈Sˆ1 01×(S−Sˆ1) ∣∣ ∗
——————————————————————————————
∗ ∣∣ . . . pis uh1s ′′rs . . .s ∣∣ 0
——————————————————————————————
∗ ∣∣ 0 ∣∣ diagh6=h1[. . . pis uhs ′′rs . . .s]——————————————————————————————
Dy,pg
∣∣ 0 ∣∣ 0

,
which in turn is column-equivalent to ∗
∣∣ ∗ ∣∣ A
—————————————————–
∗ ∣∣ diagh6=h1[. . . pis uhs ′′rs . . .s] ∣∣ 0—————————————————–
Dy,pg
∣∣ 0 ∣∣ 0

,
where A is defined by (9). This matrix has full row rank since each of the
diagonal blocks has that property. Therefore, so does the Jacobian Dy,p,ωΨ1,
at every zero of Ψ1. Thus Ψ1 is transverse to zero, and Ψ
−1
1ω (0) = ∅ for all ω
in a generic subset of Ω. uunionsq
The following result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.2:
Corollary 3.2 A state s ∈ S? is an insurable state if and only if, at any
equilibrium (y, p) of ω ∈ Ωˆ, uhs ′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′
= 0, for all h, hˆ ∈ H.
This result can be established directly for a generic subset of endowments
using standard arguments.
4 Information and Retrading
We wish to describe the kinds of (unanticipated) information that will induce
agents to retrade. We assume that the information takes the form of a public
signal correlated with the state of the world s that agents observe after trading
at date 0, but before consumption takes place,8 and before the uncertainty
regarding endowments and asset payoffs is resolved. We consider the class
of public signals that take finitely many values. Accordingly, we fix a finite
8 The assumption that information arrives before date 0 consumption is essentially just an
analytical convenience. In our setup retrade occurs when the marginal rates of substitution
between assets and date 0 consumption are not equal for a pair of agents. If information
arrives after date 0 consumption, we can replace this by the equivalent condition that the
marginal rate of substitution between a pair of assets is not equal for a pair of agents.
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set of possible “signal realizations” Σ, #Σ ≥ 2, with a typical element of Σ
denoted by σ. A public signal can then be described by a probability measure
on S × Σ, i.e. by the probabilities pi := {pisσ}s∈S,σ∈Σ ∈ RSΣ+ , where pisσ
denotes Prob(s, σ). Let pis := Prob(s) =
∑
σ pisσ, piσ := Prob(σ) =
∑
s pisσ,
and pis|σ := Prob(s|σ) = pisσ/piσ.
Since a public signal is completely described by the associated vector pi,
we refer to pi itself as a public signal. Formally, a public signal lies in the set
Π :=
{
pi ∈ RSΣ+
∣∣pis = pis,∀s ∈ S; piσ > 0,∀σ ∈ Σ}.
In other words, any public signal in Π is consistent with the uncertainty over
fundamentals given by {pis}s∈S . The condition on the marginal distribution
over Σ is without loss of generality. This specification admits a range of possi-
ble signals. It includes those that have full support, with {s ∈ S |pis|σ > 0} =
S, for all σ. It also includes signals for which the support {s ∈ S |pis|σ > 0} is
a strict subset of S for some signal realizations. A special case of the latter is
one where the signal induces a partition of S.9
In the remainder of this section, we characterize the set of public signals
that lead to retrade. Given an equilibrium (y, p), there is no retrade at pi if and
only if the equality of asset valuations which holds in equilibrium (condition
(6)) also holds at pi, i.e.∑
s∈S
pis|σ
(
uhs
′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′)
rs = 0, ∀h, hˆ ∈ H; σ ∈ Σ.
As in Theorem 3.1, we can exploit the linear independence of the subspaces
L1, . . . , LK to refine this no-retrade condition:
Lemma 4.1 Given an equilibrium (y, p), there is no retrade at pi if and only
if ∑
s∈Sk
pis|σ
(
uhs
′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′)
rs = 0, ∀h, hˆ ∈ H; Sk ∈ S(R); σ ∈ Σ. (10)
It is clear from (10) that a public signal that affects only the relative
likelihood of equal-valuation events does not generate retrade. Agents’ asset
valuations remain equal after the arrival of such a signal. For example, a public
signal that induces a partition of S that contains the equal-valuation partition
S(R), or is equal to S(R), does not generate any retrade since it leaves the
conditional distribution over Sk unchanged for every k. More generally, if pi
leads to retrade, it must belong to the following set:
Πˆ :=
{
pi ∈ Π ∣∣∃σ ∈ Σ, Sk ∈ S(R) s.t. {pis|σ}s∈Sk 6= α{pis}s∈Sk ,∀α ≥ 0} .
This is the set of public signals pi for which {pis|σ}s∈Sk is not proportional to
{pis}s∈Sk for some σ and some equal-valuation event Sk. Of course, Sk must be
nontrivial for this to be the case. Thus Πˆ is empty if markets are S?-complete.
9 We provide an example of such a signal in Example 3 at the end of this section.
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On the other hand, if markets are S?-incomplete, Πˆ is a generic subset of Π.10
It includes both partitional and non-partitional information structures. In fact,
among signals that induce a partition of S, the only ones excluded from Πˆ are
those for which the partition is (weakly) coarser than S(R).
If markets are S?-incomplete, for the generic subset of endowments Ωˆ for
which Theorem 3.2 (and hence Corollary 3.2) holds, uhs
′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′ 6= 0 for
every state s in a nontrivial equal-valuation event Sk. While the no-retrade
condition (10) is not necessarily violated for every pi ∈ Πˆ and ω ∈ Ωˆ, we show
that an appropriate perturbation of either pi or ω ensures that it is violated.
More precisely, Theorem 4.1 establishes that, for every pi ∈ Πˆ, retrade occurs
for ω in a generic subset of Ωˆ (and hence of Ω).11 Analogously, Theorem 4.2
shows that, for every ω ∈ Ωˆ, retrade occurs for pi in a generic subset of Πˆ
(and hence of Π). Finally, Theorem 4.3 strengthens Theorem 4.2 by showing
that retrade occurs for every public signal that is “sufficiently rich,” in a sense
that we shall make precise.
We say that an economy ω admits a pi-retrade if at every equilibrium of
this economy the public signal pi leads to retrade for at least one value of σ.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose markets are S?-incomplete. Then, for any pi ∈ Πˆ,
there is a generic subset Ωˇ(pi) of Ωˆ such that every economy ω ∈ Ωˇ(pi) admits
a pi-retrade.
Thus for pi to lead to retrade it is not only necessary that it belong to Πˆ
but, for a generic subset of endowments, sufficient as well. As noted above,
Πˆ is a generic subset of Π that contains both partitional and non-partitional
information. An example of partitional information that leads to retrade (in
fact, for any ω ∈ Ωˆ) is provided in Example 3 at the end of this section.
Proof of Theorem 4.1:
Consider a pi in Πˆ, and fix a σ and a nontrivial equal-valuation event, which
we can take to be S1 without loss of generality, such that {pis|σ}s∈S1 is not
proportional to {pis}s∈S1 . Let
Q1 :=
(
diags∈S1 [pis|σ]R1 diags∈S1 [pis]R1
)
.
We claim that rank(Q1) > J1. If pis|σ > 0 for all s ∈ S1, this is immediate
from the following result, which can be deduced from Lemma 5 of [4]:
Fact 1 Let Rk be the diagonal block of R
? corresponding to a nontrivial
equal-valuation event Sk ∈ S(R). Consider nonzero scalars θs, θ′s, s ∈ Sk,
such that {θs}s∈Sk is not proportional to {θ′s}s∈Sk . Then, diags∈Sk [θs]Rk and
diags∈Sk [θ
′
s]Rk do not have the same column span.
10 Notice that since Π is not an open subset of RSΣ , a generic subset of Π is open in
Π but not necessarily open in RSΣ (an open subset of Π is the intersection of Π with an
open subset of RSΣ ; see footnote 4). In particular, a generic subset of Π may include public
signals that induce a partition of S and hence lie on the boundary of Π.
11 A special case of this result, when R is in general position (so that there is only one
equal-valuation event), can be found in [5].
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Suppose, on the other hand, that pis|σ = 0 for some s ∈ S1. Let S˚1 be the
set of states in S1 for which pis|σ = 0, and let R˚1 be the S˚1 × J1 submatrix
of R1 corresponding to these states. Similarly, let S˘1 be the remaining states
in S1, and R˘1 the submatrix of R1 corresponding to these states. Then Q1 is
row-equivalent to
Q˘1 :=
(
diags∈S˘1 [pis|σ] R˘1
∣∣ diags∈S˘1 [pis] R˘1———————————————–
0
∣∣ diags∈S˚1 [pis] R˚1
)
.
If we delete the rows of Q˘1 corresponding to the redundant rows of its upper left
block, and also delete the rows corresponding to the redundant rows of its lower
right block, we are left with a block-triangular matrix whose diagonal blocks
have full row rank, and hence whose rank is equal to the sum of the ranks of the
diagonal blocks. It follows that for the full matrix Q˘1, rank(Q˘1) ≥ rank(R˘1) +
rank(R˚1). Since S1 is an insurable event, the row spaces of R˘1 and R˚1 have a
nontrivial intersection, implying that rank(R˘1) + rank(R˚1) > rank(R1) = J1.
This in turn implies that the rank of Q˘1, which is equal to the rank of Q1, is
strictly greater than J1.
Consequently the rank of
Q :=
(
diags∈S [pis|σ]R diags∈S [pis]R
)
is strictly greater than J . Therefore, we can pick j such that diags∈S [pis|σ] r
j
lies outside the column span of diags∈S [pis]R, so that the matrix
B :=
(
. . . pis|σ rjs . . .s∈S
. . . pis rs . . .s∈S
)
(11)
has full row rank J+1. We fix such a value of j for the remainder of the proof.
Recall that the equations describing an equilibrium are given by F (y, p, ω) =
0 (equation (8)). We will show that, for a generic subset of Ω, there is no so-
lution to the equation system
Ψ2(y, p, ω;pi) :=
(
F (y, p, ω)∑
s∈S pis|σ
(
uh1s
′ − µh1h2uh2s ′
)
rjs
)
= 0,
i.e. the no-retrade condition (10) is violated for the first two agents, h1 and
h2. The Jacobian of Ψ2 is
Dy,p,ωΨ2 =

∗ ∣∣ diagh[. . . pis uhs ′′rs . . .s]
———————————————
Dy,pg
∣∣ 0
———————————————
∗ ∣∣ [. . . pis|σ uh1s ′′rjs . . .s] ∗

.
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The Jacobian is row-equivalent to
∗ ∣∣ . . . pis|σ uh1s ′′rjs . . .s ∣∣ ∗
————————————————————————
∗ ∣∣ . . . pis uh1s ′′rs . . .s ∣∣ 0
————————————————————————
∗ ∣∣ 0 ∣∣ diagh 6=h1[. . . pis uhs ′′rs . . .s]————————————————————————
Dy,pg
∣∣ 0 ∣∣ 0

,
which in turn is column-equivalent to ∗
∣∣ ∗ ∣∣ B
——————————————————
∗ ∣∣ diagh6=h1[. . . pis|σ uhs ′′rs . . .s] ∣∣ 0——————————————————
Dy,pg
∣∣ 0 ∣∣ 0

,
where B is defined by (11). This matrix has full row rank since each of the
diagonal blocks has that property. Therefore, so does the Jacobian Dy,p,ωΨ2, at
every zero of Ψ2. Thus Ψ2 is transverse to zero, and Ψ
−1
2ω (0) = ∅, for every ω in
a generic subset of Ω. This generic subset depends on pi, which is a parameter
of Ψ2. Moreover, by taking the intersection of this set with Ωˆ, we obtain the
generic subset Ωˇ(pi).12 uunionsq
Next we present our second retrading result which involves perturbing
probabilities.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose markets are S?-incomplete. Then, every economy ω ∈
Ωˆ admits a pi-retrade for every pi ∈ Πˆ1(ω), a generic subset of Πˆ.
Proof:
Fix a pair of agents h and hˆ, a nontrivial equal-valuation event Sk, and a signal
realization σ. It suffices to show that the no-retrade condition (10) is violated
for these given values. Let sˆ be a state in Sk, and let j ∈ Jk be an asset which
has a nonzero payoff in sˆ, i.e. rjsˆ 6= 0. Such an asset exists since no state in Sk
is a zero-payoff state.
Consider an economy ω ∈ Ωˆ. We will show that, for pisˆσ in a generic subset
of the interval (0, pisˆ), at every equilibrium (y, p), there is no solution to the
equation system
Ψ3(y, p, pisˆσ;ω) :=
(
F (y, p;ω)∑
s∈Sk pisσ
(
uhs
′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′)
rjs
)
= 0,
and thus the no-retrade condition (10) is violated. For any choice of pisˆσ ∈
(0, pisˆ), we can always choose {pisˆσ′}σ′ 6=σ, so that
∑
σ pisˆσ = pisˆ. Moreover, if
12 We choose to state Theorem 4.1 for a generic set of endowments that is a subset of Ωˆ,
even though this is not required by our argument, in order to facilitate comparison with our
other results.
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pisˆσ is in a generic subset of (0, pisˆ), a corresponding pi is in a generic subset of
Π. Clearly pi must also lie in Πˆ, and hence belongs to a generic subset of Πˆ.
The Jacobian of Ψ3, evaluated at a zero (y, p, pisˆσ) of Ψ3, is
Dy,p,pisˆσΨ3 =
(
Dy,pF
∣∣ 0
————————————
∗ ∣∣ (uhsˆ ′ − µhhˆ uhˆsˆ ′)rjsˆ
)
.
(12)
Since sˆ is not an an insurable state, uhsˆ
′ − µhhˆ uhˆsˆ
′ 6= 0, by Corollary 3.2. Also,
we have chosen asset j for which rjsˆ is nonzero. Hence the lower right block
of (12) is a nonzero scalar. Moreover, for ω ∈ Ωˆ, we see from the proof of
Theorem 3.2 that Dy,pΨ1 has full rank, and therefore so does Dy,pF , at all
zeros of F .
Therefore, the Jacobian Dy,p,pisˆσΨ3 has full row rank, at every zero of Ψ3.
Thus Ψ3 is transverse to zero, and Ψ
−1
3pisˆσ
(0) = ∅, for every pisˆσ in a generic
subset of (0, pisˆ). This generic subset depends on ω, which is a parameter of
Ψ3. uunionsq
In Theorem 4.1, the no-retrade condition (10) is violated by fixing a pi in
Πˆ and perturbing endowments. The generic set Ωˇ(pi) therefore depends on pi.
In Theorem 4.2, on the other hand, a violation of the no-retrade condition is
achieved by fixing an ω in Ωˆ and perturbing pi. The generic set Πˆ1(ω) therefore
depends upon ω. In our final result we consider economies in Ωˆ, as in Theorem
4.2, and identify a subset of Πˆ of “sufficiently rich” public signals, which does
not depend on the economy under consideration, such that retrade occurs for
every pi in this set. A signal is “sufficiently rich” if it changes the relative
probabilities of states in some nontrivial equal-valuation event Sk not just for
one value of σ (as is the case for every pi ∈ Πˆ), but independently for a number
of values of σ that exceeds the degree of market incompleteness, Sk − Jk, in
the event Sk. More precisely, we establish the result for the following set of
public signals:
Πˆ2 :=
{
pi ∈ Π ∣∣∃Sk ∈ S(R) s.t. rank(Λpi,Sk) > Sk − Jk > 0} ,
where
Λpi,Sk :=

...
. . . pis|σ . . .s∈Sk
...σ

.
(13)
Clearly Πˆ2 is a generic subset of Πˆ.
13
Theorem 4.3 Suppose markets are S?-incomplete. Then, every economy ω ∈
Ωˆ admits a pi-retrade, for every pi ∈ Πˆ2.
13 The rank condition in the definition of Πˆ2 allows for the possibility that {pis|σ}s∈Sk is
proportional to {pis}s∈Sk for some values of σ.
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Proof:
Consider an economy ω ∈ Ωˆ, an equilibrium (y, p), a nontrivial equal-valuation
event Sk, and a pi ∈ Πˆ satisfying rank(Λpi,Sk) > Sk − Jk. Suppose there is no
retrade at pi. Then, the no-retrade condition (10) holds for event Sk, for an
arbitrary pair of agents h and hˆ:∑
s∈Sk
pis|σ
(
uhs
′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′)
rs = 0, ∀σ ∈ Σ,
which can be rewritten as follows:
Λpi,Sk diags∈Sk
[(
uhs
′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′)]
Rk = 0. (14)
By Corollary 3.2, uhs
′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′ 6= 0, for all s ∈ Sk. Therefore, the rank of
Dk := diags∈Sk
[(
uhs
′ − µhhˆ uhˆs
′)]
Rk is Jk. Let Dk be the column space of
Dk. Equation (14) implies that the rows of Λpi,Sk lie in D⊥k , the orthogonal
complement of Dk in RSk . It follows that rank(Λpi,Sk) ≤ dim(D⊥k ) = Sk − Jk,
a contradiction. uunionsq
The theorem generalizes Theorem 5 of [1]. They impose a stronger full
rank condition on the public signal; in our notation, their assumption is that
rank(Λpi,S1 . . . Λpi,SK ) = S, or that the matrix (13) defined over S rather than
Sk has full column rank. Moreover, they only consider public signals that have
full support, and hence do not include those that induce a partition of S. They
also assume that there is an insurable state, and that for each state there is
at least one asset whose payoff is positive in that state.
While in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 it sufficed to consider a public signal for only
two values of σ, for example an appropriate choice of {pis|σ1}s∈Sk for which
there is retrade conditional on σ1, and a corresponding choice of {pis|σ2}s∈Sk ,
piσ1 and piσ2 in order to ensure that pisσ1+pisσ2 = pis for all s ∈ Sk, Theorem 4.3
requires an independent change in information across at least Sk − Jk values
of σ.
The sets Πˆ1(ω) and Πˆ2, i.e. the generic subsets of Πˆ identified by Theo-
rems 4.2 and 4.3 for which retrade occurs, are not nested in general.
Example 3. Suppose there are three equally likely states, i.e. S = {s1, s2, s3}
and pis = 1/3 for all s, and the asset payoff matrix is given by
R =
1 01 0
0 1

.
Then the equal-valuation partition S(R) is given by {S1, S2}, where S1 =
{s1, s2} is a nontrivial equal-valuation event and S2 consists of the single
insurable state s3. Suppose Σ = {σ1, σ2}. Consider a public signal that induces
the partition {S1, S2}, i.e. the conditional probabilities over the three states
are given by (1/2, 1/2, 0) for one value of σ and (0, 0, 1) for the other. This
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signal is not in Πˆ and therefore does not generate any retrade. On the other
hand, consider a signal that induces the partition {{s1}, {s2, s3}}, e.g. with
the conditional probabilities given by (1, 0, 0) for σ1 and (0, 1/2, 1/2) for σ2.
This signal does lie in Πˆ. In fact, it lies in Πˆ2 since
Λpi,S1 =
(
1 0
0 12
)
,
which has rank equal to 2, greater than S1−J1 = 1. By Theorem 4.3, there is
retrade for every economy in Ωˆ. Of course, it is not necessary that the public
signal induce a partition of S in order to generate retrade. ‖
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1:
Suppose there are distinct partitions {S′k}k∈K′ and {S′′k}k∈K′′ such that the
subspaces {L′k} corresponding to {S′k} are linearly independent, as are the
subspaces {L′′k} corresponding to {S′′k}. It suffices to show that the join of
{S′k} and {S′′k}, i.e. the coarsest partition contained in both {S′k} and {S′′k},
which we denote by {S¯k}k∈K¯ , also has the property that the subspaces {L¯k}
corresponding to it are linearly independent.
Consider ¯`k ∈ L¯k such that
∑
k∈K¯ ¯`k = 0. Since {S¯k} is a refinement of
{S′k}, we can group the elements of {S¯k}k∈K¯ so that the cells {S¯k}k∈K1 are in
S′1, the cells {S¯k}k∈K2 are in S′2 and so on, with ∪iKi = K¯. Thus we can write∑
k∈K¯ ¯`k =
∑
i
∑
k∈Ki
¯`
k = 0. For each i,
∑
k∈Ki
¯`
k is in L
′
i, and is equal to
zero by the linear independence of {L′i}i∈K′ . Moreover, each element of the
sum
∑
k∈Ki
¯`
k belongs to a distinct subspace L
′′
j , and hence is equal to zero
by the linear independence of {L′′j }j∈K′′ . Therefore, ¯`k = 0 for all k ∈ K¯, i.e.
the subspaces {L¯k}k∈K¯ are linearly independent. uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
The matrices R and R′ are column-equivalent if and only if R′ = RX, for
some J × J nonsingular matrix X. Let S(R) = {S1, . . . , SK} be the equal-
valuation partition for R, and let R¯k be the Sk × J submatrix of R consisting
of the rows of R corresponding to the states in Sk. Similarly, let R¯
′
k be the
Sk×J submatrix of R′ corresponding to Sk. Consider a vector a ∈ RS , and let
ak ∈ RSk be the elements of a corresponding to Sk. We have a>R′ = a>RX
and a>k R¯
′
k = a
>
k R¯kX.
Now suppose a>R′ = 0. Then a>R =
∑
k∈K a
>
k R¯k = 0. Since the sub-
spaces {Lk} are linearly independent, we must have a>k R¯k = 0, for all k. It
follows that a>k R¯
′
k = 0, for all k, and hence the subspaces {L′k} are linearly
independent. Moreover, since {Lk} is a maximal set of linearly independent
subspaces, so is {L′k}. This establishes that S(R) = S(R′).
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Assuming for the moment that all the rows of R are nonzero, we now show
that there exists a J × J nonsingular matrix X such that RX can be written
in the form diagk∈K [Rk] as asserted in the statement of the lemma. Let Mk
be the Jk-dimensional subspace of RJ that is the orthogonal complement of
the subspace generated by {Lkˆ}kˆ 6=k. We claim that the subspaces {Mk} are
linearly independent. Indeed, consider mk ∈ Mk such at
∑
kmk = 0. Then,
`k ·
∑
kmk = 0, for all `k ∈ Lk. But `k · mkˆ = 0, for all kˆ 6= k. Therefore,
`k ·
∑
kmk = `k ·mk = 0, for all `k ∈ Lk, i.e. mk is orthogonal to Lk. By the
definition of Mk, mk is orthogonal to Lkˆ, for all kˆ 6= k. Consequently, mk is
orthogonal to RJ , implying that it is zero. The same argument applies for all
values of k.
Let Xk be a J × Jk matrix whose columns are a basis of Mk. Thus every
column of Xk is orthogonal to every row of R that does not correspond to
the states in Sk. Therefore, R¯kˆXk = 0, for all kˆ 6= k. Let X := (X1 . . . XK).
Then RX = diagk[Rk], where Rk := R¯kXk, an Sk × Jk matrix. Since the
subspaces {Mk} are linearly independent, X is nonsingular. This proves that
R is column-equivalent to diagk∈K [Rk]. Moreover, rank(Rk) = rank(R¯k) = Jk.
In the foregoing proof, the rows of R were assumed to be nonzero. If there
are some zero rows, the same argument can be applied to the matrix R? and the
set K? to show that R? is column-equivalent to diagk∈K? [Rk], and therefore
R is column-equivalent to (3). uunionsq
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